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Abstract: Guidelines for assessing whether potential evidence is relevant to some argument tend to rely on criteria 
that are subject to well-known biasing effects. We describe a framework for argumentation that does not allow 
participants to directly decide whether evidence is potentially relevant to an argument---instead, evidence must 
prove its relevance through demonstration. This framework, called WG-A, is designed to translate into a dialogical 
game playable by minimally trained participants. 
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1. Introduction  
In evidential reasoning, establishing that a piece of evidence is relevant to proving some fact may 
require the elaboration of an evidential hypothesis, typically a general premise showing how a 
candidate piece of evidence supports, or is relevant to proving, a target inference (Ball, 1980; 
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 2011). The elaboration of an evidential hypothesis may be unnecessary 
in cases where the relevance of a proposed fact is obvious, but in many scenarios, establishing 
relevance might require additional inferential steps. Furthermore, even in cases where the 
relevance of a fact appears obvious at first glance, the practice of making an evidential 
hypothesis explicit may help a reasoner to catch and minimize the influence of cognitive, 
argumentative, or stereotyping biases. 
For example, consider the use of witness testimony in determining whether someone is 
responsible for a crime. We may have previous knowledge that in a previous case, witness 
testimony sf was allowed and determined to be relevant, but the determination of why sf was 
considered relevant was not fully made explicit. If we nevertheless have a suspicion that the 
reasoning used to determine the relevance of sf might apply to the witness testimony in the 
present case, a decision procedure to test this suspicion by simultaneously generating and 
evaluating an evidential hypothesis is highly desirable. 
In this paper, we will present such a decision procedure. More precisely, assume we are 
given: 
• a factum probans / facta probantia sf (evidence given in support of sh whose relevance is 
in question);  
• a factum probandum sh (fact to be proved); 
• a factum probans / facta probantia tf from a previous case C; and  
• a factum probandum th also from C, such that (1) tf was previously established to be 
relevant to th, but a minimal or no evidential hypothesis was made explicit, and (2) the 
pair (sf, sh) are similar to (tf, th). 
Such scenarios will be familiar to proponents of case-based or analogical reasoning. The task we 
then propose to solve with WG-A is one of analogical generalization: How might one 
systematically and algorithmically use sf, sh, tf, th, and C to generate an evidential hypothesis 
which simultaneously establishes (1) how sf is relevant to proving sh, and (2) how tf is relevant to 
proving th? 
The framework we will apply to this task is called WG-A (for Warrant Game -- 
Analogy), which is based on the Articulation Model (AM) of analogical reasoning (Bartha. 
2010). WG-A allows for two participants, an advocate and a critic, to participate in a highly 
structured dialogical exchange in which a warrant (in this case, an evidential hypothesis) is made 
explicit and the relevance of facts to that warrant are tested iteratively. In other words, the 
relevance of facts is tested continually as the participants take their turns, thus offering a solution 
to the concern that any fact can be shown relevant to any other by simply creating an 
appropriately manufactured evidential hypothesis, e.g., “if (fact 1) then (fact 2)” (Michael & 
Adler, 1931; Tillers, 2005). 
Our goals for WG-A are twofold: First, we seek to create a well-defined model of good 
analogical reasoning that can be used by, and used to teach, human reasoners. Second, WG-A is 
part of a larger research project whose goals are to create highly structured modes of 
argumentative interactions which lend themselves to computational implementation (they can be 
implemented as computer programs) and automation (artificially intelligent reasoners can be 
developed which are able to participate in these interactions). By studying the kinds of reasoning 
tasks that can be carried out by WG-A, such as the target task of this paper, we hope to develop 
algorithms for automated reasoners and datasets to train them. Our present work thus seeks to 
complement existing related work (e.g., (Bex et al., 2003; Bex, 2015; Verheij et al., 2016)) by 
focusing on a model of analogical generalization which can lead to the automated generation of 
evidential hypotheses used to establish relevance. 
We will proceed by introducing Bartha’s Articulation Model, upon which WG-A is 
based. We will then explain WG-A itself, and provide summarized arguments for how WG-A 
establishes relevance. Finally, we will close with a detailed example of WG-A solving a problem 
from the target task introduced above. 
 
2.  Background 
To provide the necessary context, Sections 2 and 3 will closely follow (Licato and Cooper, 
2019). 
2.1 Arguments by Analogy  
We take as our starting point Bartha’s (Bartha, 2010) general schema for analogical arguments. 
An analogical mapping is a systematic, one-to-one correspondence between two groups of 
propositions: a source domain, and a target domain. On the basis of this mapping, an analogical 
argument concludes that some hypothetical proposition holds in the target domain. Borrowing 
terms from Keynes (Keynes, 1921), an analogical argument can be seen as consisting of four 
parts:  
• Positive analogy (P) – Proposition groups P in the source domain and P* in the target 
domain that correspond to “known similarities”.  
• Negative analogy (N) - Proposition groups A,¬B in the source domain and ¬A*,B* in the 
target domain corresponding to “known differences” between the domains. For example, 
the facts “Earth has an atmosphere” / “Mars does not have an atmosphere” would be in A 
and ¬A*, respectively.  
• Neutral analogy (O) - A set of propositions in the source such that the truth values of 
analogous propositions in the target are not known, and vice versa.  
• Hypothetical analogy (Q) - A single proposition Q known to hold in the source and a 
hypothetical proposition Q* in the target whose truth value is not known but is the 
conclusion of the analogical argument.  
An argument from analogy might thus be a claim of the following form: “It is prima facie 
plausible that Q* holds in the target because of certain known (or accepted) similarities with the 
source domain, despite certain known (or accepted) differences” (Bartha, 2013). Conformance to 
this schema alone is insufficient to determine the quality of an analogical argument; Bartha’s 
schema is meant to be entirely general, intended to represent both good and bad analogical 
arguments. Bartha’s articulation model (Bartha, 2010) is based on the idea that a successful 
analogical argument is one which identifies a prior association and a potential for generalization: 
• Prior Association. “There must be a clear connection, in the source domain, between the 
known similarities (the positive analogy) and the further similarity that is projected to 
hold in the target domain (the hypothetical analogy). This relationship determines which 
features of the source are critical to the analogical inference.” 
• Potential for Generalization. “There must be reason to think that the same kind of 
connection could obtain in the target domain. More pointedly: there must be no critical 
disanalogy between the domains” (Bartha, 2013).  
The articulation model describes how the prior association and potential for generalization can 
be made explicit and assessed through a dialogue between an advocate and critic, whose goals 
are to defend and attack the analogical argument, respectively. Because such a dialogue is meant 
to reflect real-world dialogues which take place to assess analogical arguments, the standards for 
what constitutes an acceptable prior association is dependent on the kind of vertical relations 
(i.e., the relations that hold between the elements in the source domain) being considered. 
Mathematical analogies may require such relations to be proof-theoretic, whereas for certain 
informal arguments, associations or weak causal relationships may suffice.  
We take Bartha’s work as a starting point and assume that a good analogical argument 
has a good prior association and potential for generalization.  
 
2.2 Warrants 
A warrant, in Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation, is a statement connecting the premises 
and conclusion of an argument, showing how the former permits the inference of the latter 
(Toulmin et al., 1984; Toulmin, 1958). Whereas premises may be facts, evidence, or pieces of 
data that support a conclusion, a warrant is typically a broad principle of reasoning which might 
range from truth-preserving inference rules drawn from formal, deductive models, to unreliable 
heuristic norms.  
For example, given the premise “Socrates is a man” and the conclusion “Socrates is 
mortal,” two possible warrants are W1: “Anyone who is a man is also mortal,” and W2: 
“Typically, men are mortal.” These two warrants differ in the degree to which they allow the 
premise to support the conclusion. They also differ in the ways they can be challenged: W1 can 
be refuted with a single example of an immortal man; whereas W2 requires data showing that a 
majority of men are, in fact, immortal. Given these differences in weak points, it behooves an 
arguer to ensure the strongest possible warrant is used for their arguments.  
The warrant, when made explicit, makes it easier to determine key features typically 
associated with argument strength, not limited to: (1) what kind of attacks can be used against 
the argument, (2) whether the premises are relevant or necessary to the argument, and (3) 
whether, and with what strength, the conclusion follows from the premises. Furthermore, 
whether or not a warrant was used in the creation of an argument, the process of making a 
warrant explicit and evaluating its connection to the premises and conclusion is a highly useful 
exercise in the assessment of that argument. Despite this level of utility, the warrant is often left 
implicit. This difficulty has led researchers in AI and computational argumentation to omit 
warrants from their models and datasets (Besnard et al., 2014; Habernal et al., 2014), and 
educators to leave warrants out of their lesson plans (Lunsford et al., 2002; Rex et al., 2010; 
Harrell & Wetzel, 2015). It has been observed that this omission is to the detriment of automated 
reasoning in the former case, and to students in the latter (Warren, 2010; Beach et al., 2016).  
We consider analogical reasoning to be a form of substantive argumentation, analysis of 
which renders of judgment of the plausibility of the comparison between domains.  To elucidate 
this distinction, Toulmin offers his analysis of an eighteenth-century story of the Count and the 
Abbé.  In the story, the Count tells his audience that he was the Abbé’s first penitent, and the 
Abbé later claims that his first penitent was a murderer.  Toulmin points out that treating this 
story as a formal argument leads to misleading conclusions:  
“We have only to hear this story to jump to the conclusion: ‘The Count was a 
murderer’; and truly, if we take the two statements at face value—'The Count was 
the Abbé’s first penitent’ and “The Abbé’s first penitent was a murderer”—they 
lead as they stand, by a formal argument, to the conclusion: ‘The Count was a 
murderer.’ Yet the same story can be parsed, instead, as a piece of substantive 
argumentation. What guarantee have we that either the Count or the Abbé is 
telling the truth?” (Toulmin, 2001)   
Though formal argumentation suggests that the result that the Count is a murderer, in real 
argumentation this result would need to be held in doubt due to the two different sources and 
worries about their veracity. Despite its limitations, substantive argumentation is useful in 
justifying adherence to a warrant. We will collectively refer to the kinds of reasoning processes 
which create, improve, or otherwise evaluate arguments by focusing on their warrants and how 
those warrants connect to the other parts of the arguments as “warrant-based reasoning.”  
 
Figure 1: Starting screen, as viewed by the advocate 
  
3.  The Warrant Game and WG-A 
Given the benefits of warrant-based reasoning, our previous work developed a classroom activity 
to introduce students of critical thinking to warrant-centered argumentation called “the Warrant 
Game” (WG). In WG, teams of students put forth opposing arguments. They must carefully 
phrase the warrants for their arguments, because warrants and their connections to the rest of the 
argument can be attacked by other teams using one of a predefined set of allowed attacks. If an 
attack is successful (as determined by a moderator), the attacking team gains points, whereas the 
attacked team loses points and has the opportunity to revise the wording of their warrant to 
prevent (or inadvertently open themselves up to) further attacks.  
WG provides a model for how to create, and iteratively improve on, a warrant: First, 
create an initial warrant by joining the premises and conclusion in a conditional statement (“If 
[premises], then [conclusion]”). Second, determine whether the warrant is subject to any of the 
pre-determined allowed attacks. If so, revise the warrant so it will be more resistant to these 
attacks, and then iterate until the warrant is sufficiently strong (in WG, this tends to be limited by 
time considerations or the skill level of the players). Thus, the measurement of argument strength 
used here is qualitative: an argument is considered strong if its components are resistant to 
relevant attacks. An argument’s maximal warrant strength is determined by the strongest warrant 
that can be found for it, and the strength of that warrant in turn is determined by how resistant it 
is to the attacks that can be found against it. This qualitative notion of argument strength allows 
us to define a partial ordering between arguments: Given two arguments, if one is subject to a 
subset of the attacks that another one is, then the first is stronger. Maximal warrant strength is 
meant to maintain some compatibility with the approaches derived from argument acceptability 
semantics (Dung, 1995; Modgil & Prakken, 2013; Besnard et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2017) and 
Walton’s argumentation schemes (Walton, 1985; Walton et al., 2008).  
The warrant game breaks down the task of warrant evaluation into simpler tasks, 
represented by the allowed attack types. For example, instead of detecting the gap between 
premises and conclusions (as in Boltužic and Šnajder (2016)), one allowed attack is to focus on 
the much smaller gap between premises and a warrant’s antecedent. When explaining this attack 
type to students, we might ask, “is it reasonable for you to believe the premises but not the 
warrant’s antecedent?” Although drawing on an intuition of what it means for an inferential leap 
to be “reasonable” is not yet fully achievable through AI, we suspect it might be approximable 
through natural language inference tools; and for this reason, this approach to warrant evaluation 
is in line with the long-term goals of our research program.  
 
Figure 2: When deciding to attack, the critic is given a detailed image showing links in the 
argument which are open to attack.  
  
 
 
3.1 Warrant Game – Analogy (WG-A) 
Our underlying approach to combining Bartha’s articulation model and WG is based on the 
supposition that given an analogical argument a, the process of extracting a single warrant which 
applies to both the source and target domains of a: (1) is a task which is accessible to many and 
does not require excessive training and study, and (2) will tend to elicit reasoning and moves 
which are relevant to the evaluation of a. The resulting model based on, and designed to test, this 
supposition is called WG-A (Warrant Game for Analogies).  
At the beginning of the game, an analogical argument is first presented in the form of 
source facts (P ∪ A ∪ ¬B), a source hypothetical (Q), target facts (P* ∪ ¬A* ∪ B*), and a target 
hypothetical (Q*). Players are told that Q is to be considered established fact, and the goal of the 
advocate is to show that a supports Q*, whereas the critic’s goal is to show that a doesn’t support 
Q*. The advocate begins by stating a candidate warrant which simultaneously explains the 
connection between the source facts and source hypothetical, and between the target facts and 
target hypothetical (Figure 1). A detailed example is available to the advocate at that point for 
further clarification on what is expected.  
When the advocate completes their action, control reverts to the critic1 who is given the 
choice to either update the source / target facts, send an attack, or pass.2 When two passes are 
made consecutively, the game is terminated. If a critic decides to attack, the five links which are 
possible to attack are labeled as in Figure 2. Note that there are no attackable links between the 
source domain’s facts and its conclusion, and likewise for the target domain. This is in keeping 
with the guiding principles of warrant-based reasoning: attacks should be allowed only if they 
address a flaw in the warrant or the ways in which it connects to other parts of the argument.  
When the critic selects one of the attackable links, the two linked argument components are 
displayed to the user, along with instructions for what constitutes a valid attack. These directions 
treat the two linked argument components almost as if they were the antecedent and consequent 
of a material inference. For example, consider the link summarized in Figure 3a. The critic is 
asked to explain how the rule’s antecedent fails to lead to its consequent, and is given 
suggestions for how to do so, e.g.: show that the “logical leap” between them is too far, or 
describe an example where the antecedent holds but the consequent does not. In this case, the 
critic chose the latter, and Figure 3b shows the screen that is subsequently shown to the advocate. 
The advocate then has a choice of either rejecting or accepting the attack. If the attack is 
rejected, a reason must be provided, and the advocate is encouraged to write a reason grounded 
in the instructions the critic was given when creating this attack. An attack rejection effectively 
ends that attack, but the critic can submit a similar attack later (indeed, they can do so directly 
after if necessary). On the other hand, if the advocate decides to accept the attack, they are 
rewarded with the opportunity to make another move. Though it is not required to, this additional 
move is meant to be used to modify the rule or facts in order to defend against similar attacks in 
the future.  
 
1 The move is recorded in a log that is always accessible to both participants. 
2 Passing is only an option after a certain number of moves have been made. 
Only the advocate can make edits to the rule, and such edits are not subject to approval by 
the critic. Modifications to the source or target facts, however, can be initiated by either the critic 
or advocate.  
 
Figure 3a: The critic is provided an easy-to-read explanation of how to justify their attack and 
asked to elaborate on the reasoning behind their attack. 
 
Figure 3b: When attacked, the advocate is given a summary and asked whether or not the attack 
is in accordance with the guidelines for that attack type. 
They can either add a new pair of facts (one to the source domain, one to the target domain) or 
edit an existing pair of facts. It is explained to the user that such fact pairs must be analogous, 
and can either both refer to positive analogous properties (e.g., “the chicken crosses the road” / 
“the boat crosses the stream”) or opposite analogous properties (e.g., “the chicken lives near the 
road” / “the boat is not housed near the stream”), as long as they are factual and consistent with 
the rest of the fact pairs. To ensure this factuality and consistency, all suggested fact pair changes 
by one user require approval by the other user. If the other user decides to accept a fact pair 
change, the player who made the acceptance is rewarded with another turn. If not, they are 
required to explain why they did not accept and are given the option of suggesting an alternate 
change instead, which is passed back to the other player for approval or rejection. In the current 
version, this back-and-forth is allowed to continue indefinitely, or until the user who initially 
suggested the change withdraws the motion.  
 
3.2 Comparing Warrants and the Prior Association 
With WG-A, we propose that by trying to find a common warrant that justifies both the source 
and target hypotheticals, we perform many of the same functions achieved by Bartha’s 
articulation model, namely: the extraction and clarification of a prior association, and the 
evaluation of its potential for generalization. But it may be noted by the reader that this 
alignment is not perfect; indeed, there are quite a few differences between Bartha’s prior 
association and what we are calling the warrant of an analogical argument (which itself is a 
simplification of Toulmin’s warrants, e.g. we do not explicitly represent the warrant’s backing).  
Let us therefore briefly discuss some of the differences. Perhaps most importantly, the 
warrant is inherently inferential and directional; it is meant to show how a particular inference is 
warranted given a set of premises. A prior association, on the other hand, might go in the 
opposite direction, it might be bi-directional, or an undirected relationship between P and Q. 
Bartha uses these directions to distinguish between four types of prior associations (Bartha, 
2010), most of which we can approximately capture through warrants by changing their 
qualifiers: (1) Predictive analogies (P → Q). The hypothetical Q is a consequence of P.3 (2) 
Explanatory analogies (P ← Q). Q explains P.4 (3) Functional analogies (P ↔ Q). There is an 
association in each direction (but not necessarily the same type).5 (4) Correlative analogies (P 
and Q have no known direction of priority).6  
The above list suggests that WG-A is best suited to non-functional, and perhaps non-explanatory 
analogical arguments, since those better fit our formalization of the warrant. In our initial tests of 
WG-A, we used starting fact pairs that had moral or ethical analogical arguments. WG-A 
 
3 We can express this with the warrant “If PG, then QG,” where PG is a generalization of P and P∗, and QG is a 
generalization of Q and Q∗. If the relationship is causal, we might use “If PG, then it will cause QG.”  
4 We can approximately capture this with the warrant “If PG, then it can be explained by QG.” 
5 Both directions can be expressed through warrants using the methods described above, but in many cases it is not 
clear whether it is possible to express more than one direction at a time with a single warrant. 
6 For example, we might have no more than knowledge of a statistical correlation between P and Q and express this 
as “If PG, then it’s likely that QG.” 
requires warrants to be expressed as “if-then” statements. To our knowledge, this is not 
something that was required by Toulmin or others, but it is a useful way to informally express 
many warrants, and as such is a helpful “starting point” for students still learning how to write 
warrants.  
Another important distinction is that Bartha’s articulation model first elaborates the prior 
association in the source domain, and then assesses its potential for generalization by applying it 
to the target. The warrants we propose here instead begin their lives as generalized statements, 
and have that generalizability tested iteratively through attacks and rewrites simultaneously to 
source and target domains. 
  
 
3.3 Ensuring Relevance Without Assessing It Directly 
WG-A is designed to ensure relevance in argumentative dialogues whose goals are to assess 
analogical arguments. In this section, we sharpen our claims towards meeting that goal. First, we 
adopt Bartha’s idea that a good analogical argument has a clear prior association and potential 
for generalization. Then a relevant move (with respect to some analogical argument a) is a move 
which affects the clarity of the prior association or its potential for generalization, either by 
affecting it directly or by implying a direct effect (using some measure of inferential distance).7  
Let us assume there is an argumentative dialogue D between minimally-trained 
participants, whose goal is to assess the quality of some analogical argument a. If D is 
unrestricted and face-to-face, it is extremely difficult to ensure participants only make utterances 
and actions that are relevant to assessing a. And it is also extremely difficult for some moderator 
to assess relevance of utterances in real-time. In American courts, for example, trial judges have 
“broad discretion when ruling on the relevance of evidence” (Blinka, 2006). Yet, overconfidence 
in their own ability to stay unbiased can lead to their ignoring of rules of evidence (Chortek, 
2013), and there is evidence to show that judges exposed to inadmissible biasing evidence were, 
unknowingly or not, affected by it (Eren & Mocan, 2018; Landsman & Rakos, 1994; Rachlinski 
et al., 2015; Wistrich et al., 2005). Furthermore, in adversarial trials, many objections of 
irrelevance “are simply missed because opposing counsel did not recognize the issue within the 
time limits demanded by the rules” (Blinka, 2006); other times, objections are used to 
“intimidate or confuse a lawyer of lesser skill, knowledge, and experience” (ibid). As an attempt 
to combat such problems, WG-A operates through an in-browser app, separating the players 
physically and only allowing them to make moves through the game, giving them more time to 
carefully choose their next moves. No other communication between players is allowed.  
The rules of WG-A restrict the moves that are permitted, and this paper’s central claim is 
that those allowed moves tend to be relevant to assessing a, since they tend to either strengthen 
the prior association or potential for generalization, or point out their flaws. To support this 
 
7 We are only dealing with the relevance of moves and are not addressing whether relevance is also a property of 
general utterances or other in-person actions (e.g., using voice tones to make implicit suggestions, wearing a t-
shirt with printed text priming certain semantic frames, using body language to intimidate, etc.) 
claim, let us first note that meaningful changes to the warrant correspond to meaningful changes 
to the prior association or its potential for generalization. Consider a warrant of the form “If φ1 ∧ 
... ∧ φn then γ1 ∧ ... ∧ γm,” where all φi, γj are open formulae. Then adding new conjuncts to the 
warrant’s antecedent or removing conjuncts from the consequent will tend to reduce the space of 
counterexamples to the warrant—i.e., the domain of objects for which the antecedent is true but 
the consequent is false. Likewise, removing from the antecedent or adding to the consequent will 
tend to increase the space of counterexamples. A change in the space of counterexamples to a 
warrant is a change in the ways in which the warrant can be directly attacked on the basis of its 
generality. Furthermore, any change in the antecedent may affect the degree to which it is 
applicable to the source or target domain facts (and likewise for the consequent’s applicability to 
the source or target hypothetical).  
As a WG-A game goes on, the set of conditions φi in the warrant’s antecedent will tend 
towards describing factors which are relevant in the sense that they are necessary to describe the 
prior association claimed to hold in both the source and target domains. If any conditions in the 
antecedent are relevant but missing, then the space of possible counterexamples will be too large, 
and the advocate will be motivated to narrow it through WG-A’s attack-edit mechanism. The 
advocate is discouraged from adding conditions to the antecedent that they believe are irrelevant, 
because it will unnecessarily cost them a turn. Our assumption is that this set of constraints will 
push players to only make fact pair modifications if they affect the logical connection between 
the fact pairs and the rule’s antecedent, or open up possibilities for attacks or warrant edits later.8  
Only five attack types are allowed, all of which are encouraged to come in the form of 
counterexamples. An attack on the link between the rule’s antecedent and consequent is thus a 
challenge to its generalizability. Attacks on the links connecting the rule to the source facts (L.1 
and L.4 in Figure 2) identify flaws in the rule’s applicability to the source domain, whereas 
attacking links L.2 and L.5 do the same for the target domain. Our assumption here is that most 
weaknesses in the prior association or its potential for generalization can be expressed in the 
form of attacks through one of the five links we have identified.  
 
3.3.1 Disallowed Moves 
Thus, the three major types of allowed moves in WG-A (edits to the warrant, revision of the 
source/target fact pairs, and attacks) all tend to affect the strength of the prior association or its 
potential for generalization. However, we do not claim all possible moves relevant to assessing A 
can be made using allowed moves of WG-A. Our approach to introducing moves to WG-A must 
be a slow and careful one, else we risk allowing the irrelevant or deceptive argument tactics that 
WG-A was designed to prevent. Our decisions on which move types or forms of dialogue to omit 
were made by estimating the tradeoff between a move’s ability to introduce relevant moves and 
its likelihood of allowing irrelevant moves and comments. All such decisions are subject to 
 
8 If a player is being unnecessarily abusive, clearly not following the rules of the game, or behaving in a way that is 
too far outside of what might be considered acceptable (in the opinion of the other player), the option to report 
their actions is always available to both players. When a report is submitted, the game is paused until a human 
moderator can review it and decide how to best resolve the dispute. 
change based on the results of future empirical evaluations. Notable features intentionally 
omitted from the current version of WG-A include:  
Limitations on editing. Both the advocate and critic have the option of editing the fact 
pairs in the source and target, and such edits are subject to approval by both sides. However, 
neither has the ability to make edits to the source or target hypotheticals Q. In very early versions 
of WG-A, players would sometimes edit the hypotheticals to be uninformative, uninteresting, 
uncontroversial statements. For example, the target hypothetical in Figure 1 might be changed to 
“Listening to someone else’s phone call without their permission can be immoral in some 
situations.”  
Indeed, in real-world dialogues, a participant might backtrack and weaken the scope of 
their claim in order to make it more defensible. But the intended players of WG-A do not 
necessarily deeply believe the truth or falsity of Q*. As such, the ability for the advocate to 
modify Q may introduce too much of a temptation to make them easier to defend, and it is 
therefore disallowed in the competitive version of WG-A (but in Section 4, we will introduce a 
case where enabling the advocate to edit Q* is allowed, and perhaps even encouraged). 
 
4. Developing an Evidential Hypothesis: Examples 
We will now walk through an example of WG-A applied to the target task described in this 
paper’s introduction. Our example uses two cases adapted from Klein (2013). In the source case, 
a driver named Drake is in a car accident, and is hospitalized for several days, the first of which 
was spent in an unconscious state. He wakes up, upon which his nurse (Nurse A) claims he said 
“I am in unbearable pain.” A few days later, he dies from his injuries. The driver of the other car 
in the accident is sued to compensate for the pain Drake suffered, and it is determined that the 
nurse’s testimony is relevant. However, in our toy example, the evidential hypothesis for why 
Nurse A’s testimony is relevant is not made explicit. 
In the target case, Mrs. Shepard was admitted to the hospital, apparently in a coma. 
Several days in, she woke up, and according to the nurse (Nurse B), said “my husband has 
poisoned me.” She died not long after, and her husband was charged with murder. Is the 
testimony of Nurse B relevant to the case in the same way that the testimony of Nurse A was 
relevant to the previous case, and if so, what is an evidential hypothesis justifying this 
determination?  
We structure the initial state of WG-A using the facts and hypotheticals listed in Figure 4. 
An initial, simplistic warrant is provided: “If a witness recalls the defendant waking up from an 
unconscious state and saying X, then X is likely to be true.” An immediate attack on the warrant 
(attack point L.3) seems an obvious next step. A counterexample to the warrant would suffice: 
“A witness might simply be lying about what the defendant said.”  
Such an attack can easily be responded to by the advocate, by updating the warrant to “If 
a highly credible witness recalls the defendant waking up from an unconscious state and saying 
X, then X is likely to be true.” However, this leaves attack points L.1 and L.2 open, as the critic 
might claim that the nurses haven’t been established as “highly credible.” This again is easy to 
fix, by proposing that facts be updated on both sides to include “The nurse is a medical 
professional, and thus highly credible.” 
 
 
Figure 4: Starting State and Initial Warrant for Example 1 
Such a claim is disputable by the critic, but for simplicity let us assume they accept these 
proposed fact changes. Another attack can now be launched on the warrant: “Defendants waking 
up from unconscious states are often confused, and they have been known to have distorted 
perceptions.” Examples of patients waking from comas and exhibiting paranoid behavior about 
their surroundings might be cited. In any case, the advocate is forced to respond with a 
strengthening of the warrant, and the result may be: “If a highly credible witness recalls the 
defendant waking up from an unconscious state and stating their state of mind is X, then it is 
likely their state of mind is actually X.” This warrant shift specifies that the testimony of the 
witness is relevant only insofar as it helps to establish the state of mind of the defendant, to 
which presumably, the defendant has privileged access. 
However, this shift in meaning of the warrant opens the warrant’s connections to the 
source and target to attack. Specifically, the warrant’s consequent now speaks of the defendant’s 
“state of mind,” and although the source conclusion (Drake’s feeling of unbearable pain) can be 
classified as such, Mrs. Shepard’s memory cannot. Instead, the target warrant’s consequent must 
be edited, e.g. to “It’s likely that Mrs. Shepard believed her husband poisoned her.” Now, the 
argument on the target side is not that the witness’s testimony is relevant to (directly) 
establishing whether her husband poisoned her, but rather to whether she recalls her husband 
doing so. As noted earlier, the direct editing of conclusions was not allowed in earlier versions of 
WG-A, out of concern that advocates would make the conclusion trivial and thus easier to 
defend. That concern, however, does not apply in the present example, since a trivial conclusion 
would be of little use to the advocate. 
 
Figure 5: Final State for Example 1 
The resulting state of our example WG-A game is pictured in Figure 5. Players WG-A 
can theoretically continue after this, making attacks and edits ad infinitum, but this is a natural 
stopping point, particularly because the very distinction just discussed was the one Klein (2013) 
sought to make in contrasting these two example cases. If the conclusion of the target case is 
shifted to the one in Figure 5, Klein argues, “[t]his is precisely the kind of evidence the state of 
mind exception [to the hearsay rule] is designed to allow in.”  
Also note that Figure 5 still contains a fact pair (relating to the witness’s statements being 
out-of-court) that is not made use of in the warrant. Implicitly, then, that fact pair has been 
determined to be irrelevant to the present case, at least according to the warrant-centric definition 
of relevance we adopt here. Many other fact pairs may be present but un-used in an instance of 
WG-A (e.g., the gender of the nurse, or the amount of time Drake and Mrs. Shepard were 
unconscious). It is thus that WG-A approaches determination of which factors are relevant to a 
warrant: not by requiring direct assessment of their relevance, but by putting their relevance to 
the test, and determining relevance based on the final product of the WG-A game. 
 
5. Conclusion  
WG-A is a recent contribution to a long line of highly structured argumentation games, which 
break down complex and sometimes opaque reasoning processes into easier-to-understand, 
algorithmic steps. This may lead to better artificially intelligent reasoners, if performing well at 
those simpler steps become within reach of AI. They may also lead to AI that is better at 
justifying and explaining its reasoning, particularly if we require them to break down their 
reasoning in similar ways.  
The educational implications of the above are clear as well. Experienced reasoners may 
look at some of the visualizations and moves in WG-A as obvious and trivial, but those who are 
new to legal or argumentative reasoning can benefit from seeing WG-A's possible points of 
attack clearly presented. Such breakdowns can also make it easier to design automated tutoring 
systems to help students by giving suggestions of applicable attacks and responses to those 
attacks. 
In recent work [NOTE: this is currently under publication consideration, and will be 
updated in this paper’s final version], our lab explored whether minimally trained participants 
using WG-A performed better on a task of argumentation and critical reasoning than participants 
who were simply asked to discuss an analogy in an open-ended dialogue format. Our initial 
results suggest that a benefit does in fact exist, and interestingly, this effect may be delayed: the 
participants who used WG-A did not perform much better at the critical reasoning tests 
immediately after using WG-A, but did perform better a week later than the control group. 
Future work will further explore this and related ideas.  
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